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Abstract—Detecting cyber attacks in the network environ-
ments used by Internet-of-things (IoT) and preventing them
from causing physical perturbations play an important role in
delivering dependable services. To achieve this goal, we propose
in-network Honeypot based on Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) to disrupt and mislead adversaries into exposures while
they are in an early stage of preparing an attack. Different from
traditional Honeypot requiring dedicated hardware setup, the
in-network Honeypot directly reroutes traffic from suspicious
nodes and intelligently spoofs the network traffic to them by
adding misleading information into normal traffic. Preliminary
evaluations on real networks demonstrate that the in-network
Honeypot can have little impact on the performance of IoT
networks.
Index Terms—IoT, Software-Defined Networking, Honeypot
I. INTRODUCTION
Many critical infrastructures, e.g., smart meters and smart
homes, have used Internet-of-things (IoT) to monitor and
control physical processes. Detecting cyber attacks in the
IoT network environment and preventing them from causing
physical perturbations play an important role in delivering
dependable services. Based on historical incidents in industrial
control systems, “remote insider” attacks can become a big
threat to IoT networks [1]. After penetrating into the IoT
networks, adversaries stay in a preparation stage, during which
they use the existing network traffic to study computing con-
text and collect information related to the physical processes.
With the help of collected information, adversaries can develop
and execute attack concept of operations by crafting malicious
commands in legitimate formats without raising anomaly alerts
at network levels.
Current detection approaches for IoT networks are pas-
sive [2]. Those approaches rely on anomaly patterns of
communication networks after adversaries perform malicious
activities, e.g., propagating malware, issuing malicious com-
mands [3]. The communication nodes in an IoT networks are
used to operate physical processes, e.g., opening or closing
a valve, adjusting room temperature. After adversaries inject
malicious activities into IoT networks, the impact of attacks
can quickly propagate through underneath physical processes
over a wide geographic area [4]. Consequently, even though
some passive detection approaches can identify malicious
activities, it is very challenging to prevent physical damage.
We argue that preemptive approaches, such as Honeypot
or Honeynet, which can expose adversaries at an early stage
are effective ways to prevent damage caused by attacks. In
recent years, multiple projects use traditional Honeypot for
cyber-physical industrial control systems, to attract adversaries
and trace their activities [5] [6]. However, it is challenging to
apply traditional Honeypot into IoT networks, due to three
reasons. First, IoT networks can contain a large number of
communication nodes, which makes it challenging to mimic
the network of the similar size. Second, IoT network has a very
dynamic feature; the participating nodes and their connections
can experience fast changes. Once a Honeypot is built, it is
difficult to update its implementation according to run-time
changes. Third, traditional Honeypots lack the support for
constructing meaningful application-layer payloads, e.g., mea-
surements exchanged between communication nodes in IoT
networks. Randomly generated measurements communicated
in Honeypot can reveal the presence of a bogus environment
to adversaries.
Compared to traditional Honeypots, we propose in this
paper an in-network Honeypot by using traffic-manipulation
capability enabled by Software-Defined Networking (SDN).
The in-network Honeypot does not require setting up a dedi-
cated network environment; it directly reroutes the traffic from
suspicious nodes identified at run time to an SDN controller,
which effectively quarantines the suspicious nodes from other
communication nodes. The SDN controller spoofs network
communications, which are used to interact with suspicious
nodes, on behalf of nonexistent nodes, which we refer as
phantom nodes. There is no dedicated hardware or software re-
sources allocated for the phantom nodes; their existence, e.g.,
the IP addresses, are only reflected on spoofed packets issued
from the SDN controller to the suspicious nodes. Furthermore,
we include in the spoofed traffic misleading information, such
as vulnerability of certain physical processes to mislead adver-
saries into targeting on phantom nodes to perform malicious
activities. Consequently, the in-network Honeypot can detect
adversaries’ malicious activities in a quarantined environment
without causing real physical disruptions of the protected IoT
networks.
II. SYSTEM ASSUMPTION AND ATTACK MODEL
In this paper, we consider IoT networks which rely on IP-
based networks for communications. As shown in Figure 1,
communication nodes exchange information about underneath
physical processes, such as thermostats or smart meters. There
are two common operations performed in IoT networks: con-
trol operations used to configure or operate physical processes
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Fig. 1. The architecture of in-network Honeypot for IoT.
and periodic polling operations used to collect analog mea-
surements indicating the state of the physical processes.
We consider the “remote insider” threat model in this paper.
First, we assume that adversaries can penetrate communication
nodes in IoT networks from public networks, which make
adversaries insiders. To become insiders, adversaries can ex-
ploit vulnerabilities in employee’s devices, e.g., laptops, smart
phones, or USB drives, that are connected to the IoT network.
Second, we assume that adversaries are “remote” (i.e., not an
expert) to the configuration of IoT networks as well as the
characteristics of underneath physical processes. Under these
assumptions, adversaries can monitor information exchanged
over IoT networks and thus obtain the knowledge on physical
processes to prepare for malicious operations.
We assume that the IoT networks under protections can
support SDN-enabled switches and the functionality of SDN
controlling plane is trusted. SDN is a new network paradigm
whose key feature is the separation of the control plane and
the data plane [7]. In SDN, network switches are simple
forwarding devices, whose forwarding rules can be dynam-
ically configured by a central controller. In recent years, many
telecommunication companies, e.g., Huawei, began integrating
SDN into their core wireless networks [8]. In the survey shown
in [9], Bera et al. has presented the opportunities for SDN
to address critical challenges in IoT, e.g., dynamic network
management, resource allocations, and resilience. Even though
SDN can facilitate the implementation of the in-network
Honeypot, the concept of spoofing network traffic to disrupt
and mislead adversaries is not restricted by SDN but can be
implemented by any traffic manipulation techniques.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF IN-NETWORK HONEYPOT
We present the overall design of the in-network Honeypot in
Figure 1, whose implementation relies on SDN. An SDN con-
troller can observe all communication going through network
switches under its control and use the global knowledge of a
communication network to make a traffic-management deci-
sion that can achieve optimal network performance, resource
utilization, or reliability. The proposed in-network Honeypot,
however, is to use the knowledge obtained by the SDN
controller and its programmable capability to achieve two
objectives: (1) quarantine suspicious or potential malicious
nodes and (2) mislead adversaries targeting on nonexistent
communication nodes (i.e., phantom nodes). Achieving these
two objectives, we can detect adversaries while they are
preparing attacks and prevent them from causing damage to
physical processes.
A. Quarantine suspicious nodes
We assume that existing IoT networks have intrusion de-
tection systems (IDS) to raise alerts on suspicious activities
from communication nodes. After IDS identifies suspicious
nodes, the in-network Honeypot uses SDN controllers to stop
forwarding the traffic from the suspicious nodes to other
communication nodes. In other words, the network traffic
from the suspicious nodes cannot reach any communication
nodes, which make them quarantined from the IoT networks.
Regarding all network traffic from the suspicious nodes, the
SDN controller responds with spoofed information on behalf
of the destination nodes. Consequently, the suspicious nodes
communicate with phantom nodes spoofed by the SDN con-
troller with no attachment to physical machines or software
processes.
B. Spoof communication
It is critical for the in-network Honeypot to spoof commu-
nication that can mimic the real network traffic, which can
maintain highly active interactions between phantom nodes
and suspicious nodes. Based on these interactions, the in-
network Honeypot can collect more information about those
suspicious nodes to make a trustworthy decision.
We spoof communications by adding variations into normal
communication patterns. In addition, we include some mis-
leading information in the variations to mislead adversaries
into targeting phantom nodes instead of real communication
nodes. Note that an SDN controller can observe all traffic
going through the switches under its control. We can integrate
into the SDN controller anomaly-based intrusion detection
techniques to build a normal pattern of each communication
node.
As shown in Figure 1, the in-network Honeypot needs to
construct contents at both network layer and application layer
to spoof network packets on behalf of phantom nodes. We
propose using different approaches to construct contents, i.e.,
using statistic models for network layer contents and using
physical models for application layer contents.
Construct contents at network layer
To construct contents at network layers, we first build
statistic models that can classify communication nodes based
on their network-layer characteristics. The example of these
characteristics includes the range of IP-addresses, the length
of network packets, the latency between different types of
network packets. Because many physical processes associated
with communication nodes run fixed operations and follow de-
terministic patterns, the in-network Honeypot can use network
traffic observed at the SDN controller to fingerprint physical
processes and classify network communications associated
with them [10]. The advantage of using SDN controllers is
that the in-network Honeypot does not need to interfere the
normal physical processes but to rely on observed network
traffic to build statistic models. Then at runtime, the in-network
Honeypot creates contents by following these statistic models.
Construct contents at application layer
In order to prevent adversaries from disrupting underneath
physical processes, we construct contents at the application
layer to (1) mimic the state of physical processes and (2)
mislead adversaries into disrupting the nonexistent physical
processes controlled by phantom nodes.
Fig. 2. Procedure to construct contents at application layer.
In Figure 2, we present the high-level procedure to construct
contents at the application layer. We use a vector x to represent
the state of physical processes managed by the IoT network.
Through the traffic collected by the SDN controller, we first
monitor those state variables and model their statistic charac-
teristics (in “statistic model”), such as the variation range of
each state determined by its lower bound and upper bound (i.e.,
xli and x
u
i in the figure). In the next step, we include the state
variation range in an optimization problem in the “misleading
model.” The solution to this problem is “phantom state”, which
represents the state of nonexistent physical processes that are
controlled by phantom nodes. In other words, phantom states
are the contents at the application layer of the network packets
issued from the phantom nodes.
Assume that we use function f(x, y) to represent decision
procedure of adversaries to cause physical damage, i.e., mc,
based on the observed system state and phantom state. In
the “misleading model,” we set mc as the operations that
can cause significant disruption on the phantom state but
little impact on real physical processes. Consequently, the
solutions to the optimization problem determine the phantom
states that can mislead adversaries into designing ineffective
attack strategies, which introduce no physical damage. Note
that the optimization makes both physical and phantom states
subject to the constraints of state variation range observed at
runtime. This constraint makes the resulting phantom state
follow normal variations and avoid adversaries’ suspicions.
Also, because physical processes need to follow physical laws,
we add the constraint to make physical and phantom state
consistent with the physical laws in a mathematical expression,
i.e., g(x, y) = 0 in the figure. Because this optimization
problem mimics adversaries’ decision procedure, solving the
problem requires similar computation complexity as required
to prepare attacks.
C. Handle false detection
If IDS makes a false positive detection and a suspicious
node is mistakenly quarantined, the in-network Honeypot can
use the SDN controller to restore its communication path. Ad-
ditionally, the SDN controller can profile the physical changes
initiated by the suspicious nodes. After restoring communica-
tions for suspicious nodes, the in-network Honeypot can use
the profile as reference points to update the physical process,
to avoid repeated operations from the suspicious nodes. To
profile the physical changes initiated by the suspicious nodes
at runtime and without causing real physical changes, we
can use simulations, which represent the mathematical models
of the physical process, to estimate the consequences of the
commands and record them.
In addition to handling the false positive detection after their
occurrence, the in-network Honeypot can reduce the number
of false detection in advance by increasing the accuracy
of anomaly-based IDS. Anomaly-based IDSes raise an alert
when they observe any network traffic that deviates from
normal patterns. They suffer from two drawbacks: (1) raising
false positive alerts on anomaly not due to attacks and (2)
introducing false negative detection if the IDSes build the
normal patterns based on the network traffic that has already
been contaminated by malicious activities [11]. With the help
of the in-network Honeypot, we can remedy the negative
impacts caused by these two drawbacks. When the in-network
Honeypot identifies a suspicious node as malicious, it can use
the interactions with them to build the model of adversaries
in parallel with the model of normal traffic. The adversaries’
model can help to (1) reduce false positive detection by
distinguishing attacks from anomalies and (2) reduce false
negative detection by removing malicious traffic of suspicious
nodes from the model to build the normal traffic patterns.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Environment
We used the GENI testbed, a nationwide network exper-
iment platform, to construct IoT networks with a dumbbell
topology shown in Figure 3 [12]. In the GENI testbed, we
used real SDN-enabled hardware switches to connect virtual
machines that simulate communication nodes. Because in
GENI testbed we can use virtual machines physically located
in three different areas, the evaluations can reflect the perfor-
mance of wide area communications in IoT networks. We also
constructed networks of three different sizes by changing the
number of communication nodes connected to switches. When
indicating a network, we add the number of nodes with the
name of the network topology in parentheses.
We used DNP3 as the network protocol to exchange infor-
mation [13]. Although the DNP3 protocol is mainly used in
electric and water companies, its complex structure and rich
data formats can cover wide varieties of measurements and
operations used in different IoT networks.
Fig. 3. Dumbbell topology to simulate IoT networks.
We implemented the in-network Honeypot in ONOS, an
open-source network operating systems commonly used as
SDN controllers in commercial networks [14]. Because we
used DNP3 as the protocol for communications, we included
in ONOS an encoder to spoof DNP3 packets.
B. Evaluation results
In this section, we evaluate the impact of spoofing network
traffic on the performance of IoT networks. Specifically, we
spoofed the traffic of 80% computing nodes to simulate a worst
case scenario. As shown in Figure 4, we use two performance
metrics for evaluations, i.e., the round trip times (RTT) and
the throughput of the SDN controller.
Fig. 4. Performance evaluations on spoofing network traffic (with 99%
confidence interval).
On the primary y-axis, we compare the RTT when networks
uses the in-network Honeypot to spoof traffic (“spoof RTT”)
to “normal RTT.” From the figure, we can observe that the
change of RTT is within 10% (less than 10 milliseconds). Con-
sequently, it can be challenging for adversaries to distinguish
the spoofed traffic from the real one based on the observed
variations in RTTs.
On the secondary y-axis, we compare the throughput of the
SDN controller spoofing network traffic (“spoof throughput”)
with the throughput when it directly forwards network traffic
(“normal throughput”). Compared to the “normal throughput,”
we can see that there was an approximately 30% decrease
on average; throughput of spoofing network packets varied
between 2.8 Mbps and 3.5 Mbps. For a DNP3 packet of
1 kilobyte (KB), which can contain more than 200 32-bit
measurements, the SDN controller can spoof more than 300
packets per second.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose an in-network Honeypot, which
reroutes network traffic from suspicious nodes to an SDN con-
troller to quarantine their communications in an IoT network.
After quarantining the suspicious nodes, the SDN controller
spoofs network communication with suspicious nodes on
behalf of nonexistent phantom nodes. We use both statistic
model and physical model to construct contents of the spoofed
packets. The spoofed packets can mislead adversaries into
targeting phantom nodes and thus to prevent potential physical
damage from happening on real communication nodes and
the underneath physical processes. Preliminary evaluations on
real SDN networks demonstrate that deploying in-network
Honeypot introduces small overhead on normal network com-
munications.
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